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CHAPTER 1
Conﬂict, Livelihoods, and 
Poverty in Guinea-Bissau
A Brief Overview
Boubacar-Sid Barry, Estanislao Gacitua-Mario, and Quentin Wodon
Conﬂict and political instability have considerably weakened Guinea-Bissau’s
productive infrastructure during the past three decades. This situation has
contributed to an increase in the degree of vulnerability of the population,
especially in rural areas. As growth has been weak, poverty levels have remained
high. This book provides a collection of papers on conﬂict, livelihoods, and
poverty in Guinea-Bissau based on both a nationally representative 2002
household survey and a small-scale survey with both quantitative and qualita-
tive components implemented in 2004. After a brief review of political develop-
ments since independence, this overview summarizes the report’s main ﬁndings
in the areas of conﬂict, growth and poverty, institutions and social networks,
the characteristics of the poor and determinants of poverty, the population’s
means of livelihood, and, ﬁnally, cashew production and taxation.
This book is about the social and economic impacts of conﬂict in Guinea-Bissau.There has been a substantial body of research in recent years on conﬂict, growth,and poverty; however, relatively little has been written on Guinea-Bissau, in large
part because good data sources on the country have been lacking. Today, the availability
of new household survey data makes it possible to conduct a meaningful analysis of the
impact of conﬂict on Guinea-Bissau, with a focus on the poor, tensions that still remain,
and several key reforms that could improve the future of its citizens.
Before discussing the speciﬁc case of Guinea-Bissau, it is worth emphasizing that many
of the broad lessons provided in the literature on conﬂicts apply to the speciﬁc case of
Guinea-Bissau. According to Rodrick (1999), conﬂicts are important to understanding
why economic growth is inconsistent and why the growth of so many countries has col-
lapsed since the mid-1970s. The countries that experienced the sharpest drops in growth
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after 1975 were those with divided societies (as measured by indicators of inequality and
ethnic fragmentation) and with weak institutions of conﬂict management (as measured by
indicators such as the quality of governmental institutions, rule of law, democratic rights,
and social safety nets). These ﬁndings were also conﬁrmed by Alesina and others (1996),
who concluded that growth is signiﬁcantly lower than normal in countries and time 
periods with a high propensity for government collapse. Studies also point to spillover
effects of regional conﬂicts on the economic performance of countries (Sambanis 2003).
Conﬂicts in neighboring countries also heighten the risk that the country itself will fall into
civil war (Collier and others 2003),1 a fact that is well known in West Africa.
It is often argued that the risks of conﬂicts are explained primarily by economic factors
(such as initial income, dependence on commodity exports, and the economic growth of
the preceding period), but they are also dependent on non-economic factors (such as social
fragmentation). Recent research has established that inefﬁcient institutions lead to inefﬁ-
cient policies, which can, in turn, cause conﬂicts. According to Acemoglu (2006), economic
institutions determine the framework for policymaking, placing heavy constraints on pol-
icy. Groups with political power, or the elite, often choose policies that transfer resources
from the rest of the society to themselves, which leads institutions to be inefﬁcient from the
point of view of society at large. Resource transfers can be obtained in a variety of ways, such
as through revenue extraction, factor price manipulation, and political consolidation.2
Linking institutional inefﬁciency to conﬂict, Yartey (2004) found that, based on a
cross-country analysis, weak institutions and low economic growth are major causes of
conﬂicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Along the same lines, Ghura and Mercereau (2004) pro-
vided empirical evidence that the propensity for political instability and conﬂict in the Cen-
tral African Republic has been increased by low tax revenues and deteriorations in trade.
In contrast, Campos and others (1999)—in a study on the Middle East and North Africa
over the period 1970–90—suggested that domestic political instability can have positive
effects on investment by forcing governments to adopt more efﬁcient policies. However,
external political instability tends to reduce domestic political instability and thus makes
policies more inefﬁcient.
In the speciﬁc case of Guinea-Bissau, conﬂict and political instability have weakened
the country’s productive infrastructure during the past three decades, and this has led to
an increase in the vulnerability of the population, especially in rural areas. As growth has
been weak, poverty levels have remained high. In this context, the objective of this book is
to provide an analysis of the links between conﬂict, livelihood, and poverty using recent
household survey data (the nationally representative 2002 household survey as well as a
small-scale survey with both quantitative and qualitative components implemented in
2004). After a brief review of political developments since independence, this chapter sum-
marizes the main ﬁndings of the chapters that deal with conﬂict, growth and poverty, insti-
tutions and social networks, the characteristics of the poor and determinants of poverty,
citizens’ means of livelihood, and ﬁnally, cashew production and taxation. Several areas for
future research are highlighted in the conclusion.
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1. The subject is further covered by Gudmundsson (2004), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Fosu
(2001), Collier (1999), Collier and Hoefﬂer (2002), and Easterly and Levine (1997). See also Sachs and
Warner (1997) on growth in Africa.
2. See also Acemoglu (2002, 2003, 2006a, 2006b).
Conﬂict and Political Instability in Guinea-Bissau
Following a decade-long freedom war with Portugal, Guinea-Bissau became independent
in 1974, though the country remained plagued by political instability and conﬂicts. The
government of the ﬁrst president, Luis Cabral, was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by
the prime minister and former armed forces commander João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira in
1980. Several coup attempts against the Vieira government followed in 1983, 1985, and
1993. In 1994, the country’s ﬁrst multiparty legislative and presidential elections were held.
President Vieira of the ruling Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape-
Verde (PAIGC) was re-elected with a slight margin over Kumba Yala of the Party of Social
Restoration (PRS). However, an army uprising against the Vieira government in June 1998
triggered a bloody civil war that displaced over 300,000 members of the civilian population.
Failed governance, breakdown of the rule of law, and limited accountability and trans-
parency of public sector management were among the causes of the 1998 conﬂict, which
lasted nearly a year.
By June 1999 the situation, although still fragile, improved steadily. A Government
of National Union was put in place and charged with the tasks of preparing the National
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation Program and organizing elections. Free and fair parlia-
mentary elections were held on November 28, 1999, and the presidential runoff vote took
place on January 16, 2000. Opposition parties scored a landslide victory in both elections.
Kumba Yala of the PRS was elected president, and took ofﬁce on February 17, 2000. Shortly
after, a broad coalition cabinet, including members of various parties represented in the
national assembly, was appointed.
Following the elections, parliament approved a new constitution in April 2001, but it
was neither vetoed nor promulgated by the president. The resulting ambiguity undermined
the rule of law, and a prolonged friction developed between the executive and legislative
branches of the government over the choice of the new cabinet chief. As a result, the country
operated without an effective government for several weeks, and the announcement of yet
another failed coup attempt in mid-April 2001 demonstrated once again the fragility of the
political and democratic processes. The prevailing political instability, which affected all
institutions, prevented an economic recovery and postconﬂict reconstruction.
In December 2001, the government allegedly thwarted a coup attempt by army ofﬁ-
cers. Between December 2001 and December 2002, President Yala carried out two cabinet
reshufﬂes, dissolved the parliament, and called for legislative elections, which were repeat-
edly postponed. In the ensuing discontent among the population, the army was able to
seize power in a bloodless coup in September 2003. President Yala then announced his
voluntary resignation and was placed under house arrest. The military, led by the chief of
defense, Gen. Verissimo Seabra,3 quickly restored power to civilian control, and a civilian
caretaker government was appointed with the objective of restoring the rule of law and
reasserting control over public ﬁnances. In this climate, a businessman, Henrique Rosa,
was sworn in as interim president, with the support of almost all political parties as well as
the civil society. By the end of 2003, with the support of the international community, the
newly appointed government prepared an Emergency Economic Management Plan
(EEMP) and a budget for 2004. Legislative elections were held in March 2004 and an
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3. General Seabra was killed along with other ofﬁcers during a mutiny on October 6, 2004.
orderly transition to a government elected on the basis of a broad reform platform took
place in May 2004. The transition government, led by the leader of the Partido Africano
para la Independência da Guiné-Bissau (PAIGC), Carlos Gomes Júnior was appointed
with the objective of ensuring the functioning of public administration and preparing
presidential elections by mid-2005.
Despite the difﬁcult economic situation, the government drafted a Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper and signiﬁcantly improved budgetary discipline during the second half of
2004. The government also endorsed a reform program, with the agreement of the inter-
national community; prepared the 2005 budget; and successfully organized a free, fair, and
transparent presidential election. This election was won by the independent candidate and
former president, Vieira.4 The successful elections put an end to the postconﬂict transition
that began after the civil war and brought a return to constitutional and democratic rule
in Guinea-Bissau following years of political instability and administrative chaos. At the
end of October 2005, President Vieira dismissed the PAIGC government of Prime Minis-
ter Gomes Júnior. In early November, Vieria swore in a ﬁve-party coalition government
led by PAIGC dissident Aristides Gomes. The PAIGC continues to claim the legitimacy of
the new cabinet although several parliamentarians are believed to have defected from its
ranks. In early 2006, the supreme court of the country validated the nomination of the new
prime minister, and the national assembly approved the government’s program. These
developments provided a window of opportunity for scaling up reforms and economic
reconstruction.
Conﬂict, Livelihoods, and Poverty: Contributions in this Volume
This publication seeks to provide an integrated poverty and social analysis of postconﬂict
Guinea-Bissau. The rationale for going beyond a traditional quantitative analysis of poverty
is the conviction that understanding social and political processes is essential to induce and
support the changes needed for poverty alleviation, equitable growth, and good governance.
The publication consists of six chapters. Following this brief introduction, the second
chapter measures the impact of the conﬂict on per capita GDP in Guinea-Bissau. It is worth
emphasizing that the country performed in a satisfactory manner before the 1987–98 con-
ﬂict. Following a decade of state-controlled economic policy, authorities embarked on a
comprehensive reform program in 1987, and agreed upon a three-year enhanced struc-
tural adjustment facility arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
1995. Broad liberalization of the economy contributed to a reduction in macroeconomic
imbalances. Between 1996 and 1997, the public sector primary surplus increased from 3 to
5 percent, and the external current account deﬁcit (excluding ofﬁcial transfers) decreased
from 18 to 14 percent. Inﬂation decreased from a record 50 percent at the end of 1997 to
4 World Bank Working Paper
4. The ﬁrst-round poll had seven candidates, including three former presidents: Malam Bacai Sanhá
of the PAIGC, independent candidate João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, and Kumba Yala of the PRS. The
second-round poll included Sanhá and Vieira. The latter was declared the winner in the second round,
with 52 percent of the votes and a strong backing from Yala’s supporters. Eight teams of international
observers, including an 80-strong mission from the European Union (EU), issued a joint statement saying
the ﬁrst- and second-round polls were “free, fair, and transparent.”
8 percent in early 1998, owing to restrained public sector demand and stability regained
by becoming a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Domestic
production, particularly in agriculture, accelerated with average real GDP growth reaching
more than 5 percent from 1987 to 1997.
Many of these gains vanished with the 1998 conflict. The disruption of the economy
was significant as real GDP contracted by about 28 percent in 1998 because of a sharp
decline of production activities in all sectors. The conflict also adversely affected the
country’s ﬁscal and balance of payments positions. The external current account deﬁcit
(excluding ofﬁcial transfers) remained high at nearly 16 percent of GDP and the current
primary budget balance, moved from a surplus of about 5 percent of GDP in 1997 to a
deﬁcit of about 7 percent of GDP in 1998. As a result, domestic and external debt service
arrears piled up to reach nearly 15 percent of the GDP. After the war, the real annual GDP
grew by nearly 8 percent from 1999 to 2000, but macroeconomic performance deteriorated
again from 2001 to 2004.
In Chapter 2, the impact of the conﬂict on GDP per capita, and on poverty, is assessed
using a technique to identify and correct outliers in a time series that was applied previ-
ously in an assessment of conﬂicts’ impact on GDP per capita in Rwanda (and, later, a
number of Sub-Saharan African countries) by Lopez and Wodon (2005). The estimates
suggest that GDP per capita would be roughly 42 to 43 percent higher today if the conﬂict
had not occurred. In turn, assuming that the conﬂict has had no impact on inequality
(good data does not exist on the potential impact on inequality), the authors ﬁnd that
about one-third of the population now in poverty can be said to be poor because of the
conﬂict.
In Chapter 3, the focus shifts to popular perceptions of general well-being and insti-
tutions. In Guinea-Bissau, boundaries between the public and private sectors are often
poorly defined. The financial accountability system remains weak, and the disclosure of
information on public accounts is limited. This has contributed to the erosion of public
conﬁdence in the government and, thus, citizens’ willingness to pay taxes or support gov-
ernment policies. As a result, indicators on the rule of law, government effectiveness, and
the overall risk rating of the International Country Risk Guide for Guinea-Bissau are
among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The weak governance situation dates back to the colonial era, when the state pro-
moted a limited government presence in rural areas. Traditional authorities, therefore,
played a leading institutional role in local communities under colonial rule, and the
postindependence state largely inherited the weak institutional legacy of the colonial era.
Traditional authorities, particularly in rural areas, continued to wield power in rural com-
munities, either by dominating the state-sanctioned village committees or by sidelining
them. In the end, the village committee system gradually became defunct, leaving the state
with little presence at the village level. At the same time, social and political leaders estab-
lished strong paternalistic relationships with their constituencies without building broader
coalitions or strengthening the legitimacy of existing state institutions. In recent years, the
limited progress that has been made in social service delivery, notably in education and
health, are largely due to the active role played by civil society organizations and the sup-
port of the international community.
Citizens’ lack of confidence in many institutions is confirmed by data analysis in
Chapter 3. The authors provide recent survey results that give insights into popular opinions
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about, among other issues, changes in well-being over time, trust in various institutions,
sources of conﬂict at the local level, and ways of dealing with conﬂict. There is a clear per-
ception among the population that there has been a reduction in well-being as a result of
the conﬂict, as well as a lack of improvement in the conditions of the poor, who are highly
vulnerable to the effects of conﬂict. The data also suggest a lack of improvement in per-
ception regarding postconﬂict security. Local conﬂicts often emerge because of the com-
petition for scarce productive resources, but poorer households deal with these conﬂicts
in a different way than wealthier households. Importantly, public perceptions of different
institutions indicate that local schools and health posts are the most trustworthy institu-
tions. In contrast, the populace has little trust in national institutions such as the army, the
police, the judicial system, and the central government. Nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and other civil society or community-based organizations often supplement the
weak presence of the government in rural areas.
Chapter 4 estimates the share of the population in poverty in 2002, predicts how it
may have evolved since then, and assesses the level of growth required to reduce poverty
in the future. Within the general population, the estimated poverty and extreme poverty
head counts are 65.7 percent and 21.6 percent, respectively. Findings from the small-
scale survey, completed in 2005, suggest that most households believe that their living
situation has worsened not only compared to the preconflict period, but also in years
since. This is confirmed by simulations of changes in poverty after 2002 as related to
growth in GDP per capita. These simulations suggest that the number of those in poverty
may have increased from 65.7 percent in early 2002 to 72.3 percent by the end of 2005.
This means that it will be difficult to reach the first target of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. For example, if the economy were to grow at 4 percent per year, it would take
11 years to achieve a cumulative growth rate of 25 percent, which would, in turn, reduce
the share of the population in poverty from the estimated level of 72.3 percent in 2005
only to 58.8 percent by 2020. The chapter also provides a brief poverty profile and an
analysis of the determinants of poverty using the nationally representative survey of
2002. Geographic location, demographic structure (both household size and headship),
employment (both in terms of sector and type), education, and migration all have
potentially large effects on the consumption level and thereby the poverty of households.
For example, the incidence of poverty among household heads with tertiary education
is less than half of that for heads with no level of education. Poverty incidence is also
higher among households with heads working in agriculture, compared to government
and private sector workers.
The ﬁfth chapter analyzes modes of livelihood among Guinea-Bissau’s population.
The country is poor and highly dependent on agriculture and extractive activities such as
fishing. Yet, beyond such general statements, it is useful to describe in qualitative terms
the main activities that take place both in rural areas at the regional level, and in urban
areas through mostly informal employment (as already discussed in Lourenço-Lindell,
2002). This is done on the basis of ﬁeldwork conducted in the country in early 2005. In
addition, the chapter provides a brief quantitative, empirical analysis of the main income
sources of households, and a more detailed analysis of two key sectors of the economy that
could form the basis of a growth strategy: cashew nuts and ﬁshing.
In addition, Chapter 5 suggests that most urban families essentially live off of activi-
ties in the informal sector. For urban men, casual work is increasingly the main activity and
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livelihood strategy. This represents a serious cause of vulnerability as formal wage oppor-
tunities become limited. As for women, they have historically played an important role in
small trading, domestic work, dressmaking, weaving, the extraction of cashew juice and
wine, and so on. During periods of harvests, some people, especially younger women and
youth, seasonally migrate to rural areas to offer their labor to farmers, particularly cashew
producers. In rural areas, subsistence agriculture represents the main livelihood strategy.
Rice remains the most widely grown staple crop, but cashews have played an increasingly
important role, providing an important source of income for many households. The liveli-
hood strategies of the rural poor tend to differ across regions and are also inﬂuenced by the
social characteristics of households and individual household members (such as ethnicity,
family structure, sex, religion, age, and so on). For example, agriculture and cattle are the
main livelihood means in the northern and eastern regions and in part of the south (rice),
while ﬁshing is common in the south and the islands.
The sixth and last chapter provides a review of the cashew sector in Guinea-Bissau, as
well as estimates of the likely impact of changes in farm-gate prices and export taxes on
poverty among cashew producers and in the country as a whole. Relatively high transac-
tion costs represent an implicit tax on cashew producers. Reducing these costs would likely
increase the farm-gate price for cashew producers, and therefore improve the consump-
tion of goods and services. The available evidence suggests that a 15 percent increase in
farm-gate prices for cashew nuts could result in an increase in consumption of 9.5 percent
for the extreme poor, and 3.3 percent for the poor. In contrast, an increase of about 10 per-
cent in the export tax on unprocessed cashew nuts potentially could generate (with full
pass-through to farmers) a reduction in the farm-gate price of close to 15 percent, assum-
ing that farmers get 70 percent of the export price. The chapter also notes that over the last
three decades, the production of rice has decreased signiﬁcantly in favor of cashews. This
situation may, under some circumstances, represent a threat to food security. For the rural
sector to ensure food security and create new jobs, policymakers would need to adopt a
coherent agrarian development strategy in the context of the Poverty Reduction Strategy,
which would aim to rehabilitate and encourage rice production while promoting the pro-
cessing of raw cashews into exportable cashew kernels in order to generate more added
value in the cashew sector.
Next Steps
The analysis presented in this volume is only a beginning, as several key policy areas have
not been dealt with that warrant speciﬁc attention. Of special importance is the need for
Guinea-Bissau’s authorities to restore ﬁscal sustainability through public sector reform.
This need is partly because of recent conﬂicts and the resulting increase in the size of the
security forces, but also because the public wage bill has become excessive following recent
increases, leading to large budget deﬁcits and the scarcity of resources that should be allo-
cated to poverty reduction. There is a serious need to bring the public sector wage bill, exclud-
ing education and health care, to a sustainable level, and to reform the security sector.
Apart from freeing resources for attacking poverty, preliminary evidence suggests that a
reduction in the wage bill could also be good for growth. Indeed, if real government con-
sumption (namely wage spending) were reduced by 2 percent (5 percent in nominal terms
Conﬂict, Livelihoods, and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau 7
corresponding to 1 percentage point of the GDP) annually over 2006–08, the estimates sug-
gest that real GDP could increase by about 1.6 and 2.9 percentage points in 2007 and 2008,
respectively, compared to baseline growth targets for the same years.
Public sector downsizing will, however, not be sufﬁcient for achieving medium-term ﬁs-
cal sustainability. The government will need to pursue sound expenditure management and
improve the efﬁciency of revenue collection by reinforcing and sustaining the ongoing reforms
in key departments of the ministries of ﬁnance and ﬁsheries to achieve a current surplus. There
is also a need to address the size of the pension system and the ethnic composition of the armed
forces over the medium- and long-term. The sustainability of Guinea-Bissau’s external debt
also remains a concern, as medium-term debt sustainability will depend on continued ﬁscal
adjustment and support from the international community. Finally, persistent internal
political tensions, the weak institutional and governance capacity of the state, and the
vulnerability of cashew nuts to external price ﬂuctuations represent ongoing challenges.
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